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Arnold Rochvarg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The most famous scandal of the twentieth century was the Water-
gate scandal, which most notably led to the resignation of Richard 
Nixon as President of the United States. The significance of Water-
gate, however, extends further than the resignation of Nixon. Because 
Watergate involved so many lawyers, it had a great impact on the reg-
ulation of the legal profession.1 Although the twenty-first century has 
just started, the strongest contender for this century's most famous 
scandal is the Enron scandal. Although the Enron scandal is identi-
fied mostly with misconduct by accountants and corporate officials, it 
too involved lawyers and has impacted on the regulation of the legal 
profession.2 Although the two scandals differ in that Watergate was a 
political scandal involving the misconduct of government officials, and 
Enron was a financial scandal involving misconduct of accountants 
and corporate officials, the issues involving lawyers are identical. 
Most significant to this symposium is that both scandals involve im-
portant issues concerning the role of an attorney for an organization 
when the attorney learns of information indicating misconduct by 
those working for and/or in charge of the attorney's organizational 
client. The purpose of this article is to discuss these issues as 
presented by the Watergate and Enron scandals, and to analyze how 
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Professor Rochvarg is the author of 
WATERGATE VI=ORY: MARDIAN'S ApPEAL (1995), which is the source of much of the factual 
discussion of the Watergate scandal in this article. Professor Rochvarg served as a member of 
the legal defense team for Robert C. Mardian, former Assistant Attorney General of the United 
States, who was convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice along with former Attorney General 
John Mitchell and former Nixon White House aides John Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman at the 
Watergate conspiracy trial before Judge John Sirica. Mardian's conviction was reversed on 
appeal. 
1. When John Dean testified before the Senate Watergate Committee, he was asked about 
"stars" he had placed next to certain names on a list he had compiled. Dean responded that he 
had placed "a little asterisk beside each lawyer, and that his reaction was how in God's name 
could so many lawyers get involved in something like this." Presidential Campaign Activities of 
1972: Hearing on Watergate and Related Activities: Phase I: Watergate Investigation Before the 
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1053-54 
(1973) (statement of John Dean, White House Counsel). See Donald T. Weckstein, Watergate 
and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 261 (1974). When Weckstein wrote his article, he 
identified himself not only as Dean and Professor of Law at University of San Diego, but also as 
an "unindicted lawyer." Id. at 261. 
2. Harvey Pitt when he was chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in a speech to the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) asked regard-
ing Enron, "Where were the lawyers?" and "What were the lawyers doing to prevent violations 
of the law?" Harvey Pitt, Speech to the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association 
(Sept. 20, 2002), quoted in Rachel McTague, Pitt Says SEC Will Take on Assignment of Disciplin-
ing Lawyers if State Bars Do Not, 18 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) No. 20, at 591 
(Sept. 25, 2002). 
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the responses by the legal profession and the federal government have 
impacted the regulation of the legal profession. The article will first 
discuss how issues involving the role of an attorney when representing 
an organizational client that has engaged in misconduct were central 
to the Watergate scandal. The article will then discuss reforms of the 
legal profession that were made in response to Watergate. These re-
forms were primarily the efforts of the legal profession itself. Next, 
the article will discuss the similarity of the Enron scandal to the 
Watergate scandal. Enron also involved issues of an attorney's role 
when representing an organizational client that has engaged in mis-
conduct. As the article will discuss, the reform efforts in response to 
the Enron scandal differed from those in response to Watergate in 
that after Enron, the federal government through the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, and various actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), sought to control various aspects of the regulation of the legal 
profession. As the article will demonstrate, the Enron scandal has 
brought forth changes that seriously challenge the traditional view of 
the legal profession as self-regulating. 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS, CONFIDENTIALITY 
AND WATERGATE 
Two of the defendants at the Watergate conspiracy trial became 
involved in the Watergate scandal through their roles as attorneys for 
the Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP). CRP was the organi-
zation formed by President Nixon and Attorney General John Mitch-
ell to run Nixon's re-election campaign. Although CRP was not a for-
profit corporation, CRP's entity status is analogous to the corporate 
status of Enron with regard to the issues relevant to this symposium. 
On June 17, 1972, a group of men were arrested at the Demo-
cratic National Committee (DNC) offices in the Watergate office 
complex in Washington, D.C. Among those arrested was James Mc-
Cord who was an employee of CRP. A few days later, a civil suit was 
filed against CRP by the DNC seeking damages for invasion of pri-
vacy based on the tort doctrine of respondeat superior. Robert Mard-
ian, a campaign official at CRP, was assigned by John Mitchell, now 
Director (the top official) of CRP, to serve as CRP's lawyer in defense 
of the DNC civil suit. Mardian had previously served as an Assistant 
Attorney General at the Justice Department under Mitchell. Because 
of his campaign duties, Mardian was not expected to handle the actual 
litigation, and a few weeks later, with Mitchell's concurrence, Mardian 
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hired Kenneth Parkinson, a partner in a Washington, D.C. law firm, to 
take over the representation.3 
Neither Mardian nor Parkinson had any first-hand knowledge of 
any of the facts relating to the Watergate break-in. In order to carry 
out their duties as attorneys for CRP, both Mardian and Parkinson 
met with various employees of CRP in order to learn the facts to pre-
pare CRP's litigation defense. Among the persons that Mardian and 
Parkinson interviewed were Gordon Liddy and Jeb Magruder, both of 
whom had personal knowledge of matters relevant to the Watergate 
break-in. Perhaps most significant was Mardian's meeting with 
Gordon Liddy.4 At this meeting, held a few days after the break-in, 
Liddy was so concerned about confidentiality that Liddy turned on 
the radio to avoid any possible recording of their conversation. At 
first, Liddy tried to establish that he was talking to Mardian as his 
personal attorney. Mardian, however, told Liddy that he was the law-
yer for CRP and was not acting as Liddy's personal attorney. Mardian 
did tell Liddy that since Liddy was an employee of CRP, Liddy's com-
munications were confidential except that Mardian would be obli-
gated to report what he learned to John MitchelLS Thereupon, Liddy 
told Mardian many of the details of the planning of the Watergate 
break-in. These details included facts about his own involvement as 
well as the involvement of others who were CRP employees. Liddy 
also asked Mardian whether CRP would pay the bail for the arrested 
burglars. Following his meeting with Liddy, Mardian immediately re-
ported to Mitchell what Liddy had told him. Mitchell reacted with 
shock and denial. Mitchell told Mardian that CRP would not provide 
any money to the burglars. Subsequent to his meeting with Mitchell, 
Mardian arranged a meeting between Liddy and Parkinson. At this 
meeting, Liddy offered Parkinson a one-dollar bill as a retainer to 
supposedly establish an attorney-client relationship between Parkin-
son and Liddy. When Parkinson refused to take the dollar bill, Liddy 
refused to speak with Parkinson. 
Also relevant was a meeting which Mardian arranged between 
Parkinson and Jeb Magruder, Deputy Director of CRP. At this meet-
ing, Magruder told Parkinson about his own involvement in the plan-
ning of the Watergate break-in and about the involvement of others 
including Mitchell. Parkinson then went to Mitchell and told him 
3. Mardian could be viewed as CRP's inside counsel; Parkinson could be viewed as CRP's 
outside counselor litigation counsel. 
4. Liddy's official title during the campaign was General Counsel for the Finance 
Committee. 
5. Mardian did not warn Liddy that Mitchell would be free to disclose what Liddy said, but 
"[t]hat was a risk Liddy had to take." ARNOLD ROCHVARG, WATERGATE VICTORY; MARDIAN'S 
ApPEAL 39 (1995). 
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what he had just been told by Magruder. Mitchell responded that Ma-
gruder's story "was not true and was nonsense."6 
In the invasion of privacy lawsuit filed by the DNC, the defense 
presented by CRP through its attorneys was that CRP had no liability 
for the break-in because any CRP employees involved in the break-in 
were on a "lark or frolic of their own."7 We, of course, now know that 
this was not true. In fact, Mitchell and Magruder, the top two persons 
at CRP, were fully aware of the plans for the break-in. If Mardian or 
Parkinson, the attorneys for CRP, had reported the misconduct that 
they had learned from Liddy and Magruder to the FBI in the summer 
of 1972, the nation would have been spared the nightmare of Water-
gate. But the attorneys did not reveal their client's misconduct. In-
stead the attorneys kept the information confidential and argued to 
the court (and the nation) that CRP had not engaged in wrongful 
conduct. 
Both Mardian and Parkinson were indicted for conspiracy to ob-
struct justice with co-defendants John Mitchell and White House aides 
H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman.8 At the Watergate conspiracy 
trial before Judge Sirica, a key component of the defense of both 
Mardian and Parkinson was that they had been acting as attorneys, 
not conspirators. Both defendants justified their meetings with con-
spirators Jeb Magruder and Gordon Liddy as an attorney's responsi-
bility to investigate the facts. No disclosure to persons outside of CRP 
of what the attorneys learned during their investigation had been 
made because of their ethical duty of confidentiality. Both Mardian 
and Parkinson went to the head of CRP, John Mitchell, and reported 
to him what they had learned. Both had been told by Mitchell that 
these facts were not true and that there was no CRP involvement in 
the Watergate break-in. Both attorneys argued that the arrested CRP 
employees had been on a "lark of their own" because this was a plau-
sible, non-frivolous defense based on what they learned during their 
investigation on behalf of their client, CRP. 
Mardian's defense that his duty of confidentiality to Liddy pro-
hibited Mardian from making disclosures to anyone except Mitchell 
was challenged by the prosecution as a fa~ade behind which Mardian 
was trying to hide. In response, Mardian's lawyers requested that an 
instruction be given to the jury based on the Code of Professional 
Conduct as it was,in effect in Washington, D.C. during the relevant 
time period. In response to this request, Judge Sirica gave the follow-
ing instruction to the jury: 
6. [d. at 68. 
7. [d. at 70. 
8. Parkinson was also indicted for obstruction of justice. Richard Nixon was named an 
unindicted co-conspirator. 
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Two defendants, Messrs. Mardian and Parkinson, claim to have par-
ticipated in or directed the legal representation of the Committee to 
Re-elect the President in response to a civil suit filed by the Demo-
cratic National Committee. This fact may have some bearing on the 
specific intent of these two defendants. In weighing and evaluating 
the evidence relating to the element of intent, you should consider 
whether the actions taken by each of these defendants were under-
taken with a criminal intent and in furtherance of the conspiracy 
charged. 
Let me point out that a lawyer has a duty to become fully informed 
of all facts of the matter he is handling. 
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is absolutely confi-
dential, requiring a high degree of trust and good faith. An attorney 
is ethically required to preserve the confidences and secrets of his 
clients. This is the basis of the so-called attorney-client privilege. 
It is well settled, however, that this attorney-client privilege which 
we are talking about does not extend to communications between 
an attorney and client which are in aid of or in furtherance of a 
crime or fraud. The privilege does not apply to shield such criminal 
conversations. 
What all this boils down to is a question of intent. If you find, based 
on the evidence and what I have told you about the duties and limits 
on the duties of a lawyer, that either or both of these defendants 
(Mr. Mardian and Mr. Parkinson) lacked the criminal intent to join 
and further the conspiracy charged in Count One because he was 
merely doing his job as a lawyer, you must find that defendant not 
guilty of Count One. But if you find that either Mr. Parkinson or 
Mr. Mardian, or both of them, were acting with the intent to partici-
pate in the alleged conspiracy, then the fact that he happened to be 
active as a lawyer also is no defense, and he should be found guilty 
provided all the other elements are also established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.9 
65 
The jury acquitted Parkinson but convicted Mardian. Mardian was 
sentenced to a prison term of ten to thirty-six months. 
In his appeal, Mardian presented a few arguments to the Court of 
Appeals that focused on his role as attorney for CRP: 
• Whether the jury instructions were inadequate because they 
failed to instruct the jury on an attorney's professional obliga-
tions when the client is an organization; 
• Whether the jury instructions were inadequate because they 
failed to instruct the jury that an attorney's professional obliga-
tions required him to resolve doubts about credibility in favor of 
his client; and 
• Whether the jury instructions were inadequate because they 
failed to instruct the jury about Mardian's professional obliga-
tion to keep Liddy's communications confidential. 
Although the Court of Appeals rejected Mardian's arguments that the 
jury instructions were inadequate, it did reverse Mardian's conviction 
9. ROCHVARG, supra note 5, at 250-51. 
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on the ground that Mardian's trial should have been severed from the 
others. 1O 
III. REFORMS TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
RESPONSE TO WATERGATE 
Throughout the period of the Watergate scandal, the legal profes-
sion was heavily criticized for its seemingly unethical behavior. It was 
frequently noted that many of the Watergate defendants were lawyers. 
Although many of the Watergate culprits were lawyers, the only de-
fendants who had actually acted in a capacity as a lawyer in the Water-
gate matter were Mardian and Parkinson. Nevertheless, Watergate 
led to increased attention to the regulation of the legal profession. 
During the Watergate period, most states based their rules of pro-
fessional conduct on the Code of Professional Responsibility which 
had been adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) House of 
Delegates in 1969. The ABA, a private, voluntary organization of 
lawyers, first adopted rules of professional conduct in 1908 when it 
approved the Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons). The Canons 
originally were adopted as the rules of conduct for those lawyers who 
were members of the ABA, which at the beginning of the twentieth 
century represented only a small percentage of the lawyers in the 
United States. Despite their original purpose, shortly after their 
adoption by the ABA, the Canons became a model set of guidelines 
which most states adopted as binding rules for their state courts. 
These rules were enforceable through the states' official disciplinary 
processes. Thus, although drafted by the ABA, the Canons became 
binding law through their adoption by state governments, most nota-
bly the supreme courts of each state. During the 1960s, the ABA de-
cided that a wholesale revision of the Canons was appropriate. This 
led the ABA to draft the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). 
The ABA Code was extremely influential. Just about every state 
amended its attorney professional responsibility rules from ones based 
on the Canons to ones based on the Code by the early 1970s. At the 
time of the Watergate scandal, the ABA Code was the prevailing 
model upon which states based their rules. 
The ABA Code offered little guidance on the professional re-
sponsibilities of an attorney representing an organization such as CRP 
or any other business organization. The only provision in the ABA 
Code relevant to organizational clients was in Ethical Consideration 
5-18.11 This section provided that an attorney for an entity owed his 
10. United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Subsequently, the Office 
of Special Prosecutor decided not to retry Mardian, and the charges were dropped. 
11. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1969) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]' 
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allegiance to the entity and not any individual of the entity, i.e., not to 
any director or employee. No other guidance on organizational cli-
ents was provided. The Code did provide more guidance on the confi-
dentiality issues raised in the Watergate case. Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(B)(1) of the Code provided that if a lawyer received information 
"clearly establishing" that his client has "perpetrated a fraud upon a 
person or tribunal," the lawyer "shall promptly call upon his client to 
rectify" the fraud, and if the client refused to rectify the fraud, the 
attorney was required to reveal the fraud. 12 The District of Columbia, 
however, had not adopted the mandatory disclosure provision; the 
rule adopted in the District of Columbia only required that the attor-
ney tell his client to rectify the fraud. If the client ignored his attor-
ney, the attorney was not permitted to make any disclosures. Because 
the law of the District of Columbia was the relevant law at the Water-
gate conspiracy trial, Mardian relied on the District of Columbia ver-
sion to support his position that he had acted properly, or at least 
without criminal intent, when he made no disclosure to the authorities 
of what had been communicated to him by Liddy and Magruder. 
Partly as a result of the Watergate scandal, persons both within 
and outside the legal profession in the mid-1970s believed that the 
ABA Code was inadequate. Even though the ABA Code had only 
recently been adopted by the ABA and had only recently been relied 
upon by the states in updating their rules of professional conduct for 
attorneys, the prevailing view was that change in the legal profession 
was needed. The opinion was expressed that if lawyers had acted dif-
ferently during Watergate, the nation would have been spared the 
trauma of the Watergate scandal. The opinion was also expressed that 
the lawyers involved in Watergate, and in fact all lawyers, relied upon 
the rules of professional conduct to avoid their responsibility to soci-
ety. The phrase "Watergate defense" was used to describe a position 
of absolute confidentiality arising from the attorney-client relationship 
which lawyers honored no matter what illegal actions had been com-
mitted or contemplated by their clients and no matter what conse-
quences to the public these illegal actions would cause.13 State 
attorney disciplinary boards also came under attack for their failure to 
adequately police the legal profession. Not to be left out were the law 
schools. Legal education was criticized for its failure to instill the 
proper values in its graduates. From all these criticisms, new emphasis 
on legal ethics began after Watergate.14 Many saw the Watergate 
12. MODEL CODE DR 7-102(B)(I). 
13. The ABA's "Watergate Rules," WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1981, at A20. 
14. Former Vice President Spiro Agnew, who was forced to resign as vice president, coined 
the phrase "post-Watergate morality." 
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scandal as an opportunity for meaningful reform of the legal 
profession.15 
The legal profession responded to Watergate in a few ways. New 
emphasis was placed on professional responsibility courses in the law 
schools. For the first time, by the late 1970s, 100% of law schools 
offered a course on professional responsibility.16 Bar examiners in-
creasingly added Professional Responsibility to those subjects tested 
on the bar exam. The ABA, which had only a few years earlier 
adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, embarked on 
a project that would lead to the wholesale revision of the ABA Code. 
A prominent group of lawyers headed by Robert Kutak worked for 
six years, holding open hearings throughout the country and eliciting 
views from the entire profession in order to develop a new set of 
model rules for the legal profession. The Kutak Commission's work 
sparked a debate over lawyer ethics and professional responsibility 
that had never been seen before. The ABA's work also led most 
states to reevaluate their rules of professional conduct. Bar commit-
tees at the state level were formed to comment on the Kutak Commis-
sion's work and to make recommendations to the state courts. 
Most significant to this symposium are the ABA's post-Watergate 
positions on an attorney's professional obligations when the client is 
an organization and an attorney's duty of confidentiality. The Kutak 
Commission recommended to the ABA House of Delegates that it 
adopt a rule which would specifically cover an attorney's professional 
obligations to an organizational client, both for-profit corporations 
and non-business entities. This was a significant step in the regulation 
of the legal profession. Although the ABA Code, adopted in 1969, 
had a section that provided that when representing an organization, 
the lawyer'S client was the organization, this section did not set forth 
any special professional responsibilities for a lawyer representing an 
organization. After extensive discussion, the Kutak Commission rec-
ommended a new rule, numbered 1.13 and titled "Organizations as 
the Client." The Kutak Commission's proposal sought to deal with 
what an attorney could and should do if the attorney for an organiza-
tion learned of misconduct within the organization. The Kutak Com-
mission's proposal provided in relevant part: 
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee 
or other person associated with the organization is engaged in 
action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the 
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the 
15. Weckstein, supra note 1, at 263 ("Out of the debris of these fallen idols an opportunity 
for professional reform, more favorable than perhaps at any other time in our history, has 
arisen."). 
16. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 39 (1992). 
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organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be 
imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substan-
tial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is 
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. 
In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due con-
sideration to the seriousness of the violation and its conse-
quences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, 
the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motiva-
tion of the person involved, the policies of the organization 
concerning such matters and any other relevant considera-
tions. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize dis-
ruption of the organization and the risk of revealing 
information relating to the representation to persons outside 
the organization. Such measures may include among others: 
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter; 
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be 
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the 
organization; and 
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organiza-
tion, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the 
matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in 
behalf of the organization as determined by applicable 
law. 
(c) When the organization's highest authority insists upon action, 
or refuses to take action, that is clearly a violation of a legal 
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which rea-
sonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to 
result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may 
take further remedial action that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves to be in the best interest of the organization. Such ac-
tion may include revealing information otherwise protected by 
Rule 1.6 [the confidentiality rule] only if the lawyer reasonably 
believes that: 
(1) the highest authority in the organization has acted to fur-
ther the personal or financial interests of members of that 
authority which are in conflict with the interest of the or-
ganization; and 
(2) revealing the information is necessary in the best interest 
of the organization.!7 
69 
If this had been the prevailing standard during the Watergate scandal, 
it could have been argued by the prosecution that Mardian and Par-
kinson, as CRP's attorneys, could have ethically reported the miscon-
duct by CRP's employees to persons outside of CRP, i.e., to the FBI. 
The first step under proposed Rule 1.13 was for Mardian and Parkin-
son to report to CRP's head, John Mitchell, what they had been told 
about the involvement of CRP employees in the break-in. When 
Mitchell refused to act because of his own personal interest, the next 
step authorized by the proposed rule was "revealing the information" 
17. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2003 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 65 (2002)_ 
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if this was necessary in the best interests of the organization even if 
otherwise protected by the rule of confidentiality.I8 
When Rule 1.13, as proposed by the Kutak Commission, was 
presented to the ABA House of Delegates, the part of subsection ( c) 
which permitted a lawyer for an organization to take remedial steps 
outside the client organization, including disclosure of confidential in-
formation to government authorities, was rejec~ed. Subsection (c) was 
redrafted and approved by the House of Delegates to provide as 
follows: 
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), 
the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization in-
sists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law 
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the 
lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.19 
By rejecting the Kutak Commission proposal, the ABA adopted per-
missive withdrawal, not disclosure, as the appropriate response when 
an attorney's organizational client is engaged in wrongdoing, and the 
top organizational officials refuse to remedy the wrongdoing. This re-
sponse had been Mardian's response in Watergate. He withdrew as 
counsel for CRP in the DNC civil suit and returned to full-time cam-
paign duties after making disclosure to Mitchell. 
To many, the ABA's decision on Rule 1.13 was disappointing. 
They argued that the ABA had failed to respond adequately to those 
critics of the legal profession who had argued that attorneys do not do 
enough to protect society from the wrongdoing of their clients. De-
spite the ABA's rejection of the Kuta~ Commission's proposal to per-
mit disclosure of wrongdoing outside the organization when the 
organization's highest officials have failed to respond to the wrongdo-
ing, some states did adopt the Kutak Commission's version of Rule 
1.13 after reexamining the rules of professional conduct to be applied 
in their states, and thus disclosure was permitted in these states.20 
The Model Rule governing confidentiality that was eventually 
adopted by the ABA was also disappointing to those critics of the 
legal profession who had hoped for greater reform in the post-Water-
gate era. Again after much study and debate, the Kutak Commission 
proposed a rule which expanded a lawyer's duty of confidentiality be-
yond what had been in place under the Model Code during the Water-
gate years. This was somewhat surprising bec2,use many believed a 
lawyer's duty of confidentiality was too broad already and that confi-
18. This does not necessarily mean that such disclosure would have been clearly required. 
For example, Mardian's position at trial was that he did not "know" the true facts, and that 
based on Mitchell's reputation and friendship, Mardian was more inclined to believe Mitchell's 
denials than the allegations from Liddy and Magruder. 
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDU= R. 1.13 (2001). 
20. Such states include Maryland, Michigan and New Jersey. 
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dentiality was one reason permitting the Watergate scandal to occur. 
The confidentiality rule proposed to the ABA by the Kutak Commis-
sion was as follows: 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation, 
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to 
carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph 
(b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraud-
ulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to 
result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substan-
tial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another; 
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraud-
ulent act in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services 
had been used; 
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in 
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, or to 
establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim, or 
disciplinary complaint against the lawyer based upon 
conduct in which the client was involved; or 
(4) to comply with other law.21 
As just discussed, this proposal reflected the Kutak Commission's po-
sition that the protections of confidentiality under the already existing 
Model Code were not broad enough. This proposal expanded client 
confidentiality protections in a few ways. First, confidentiality at-
tached to all information about a client relating to the representation. 
Under the Model Code, confidentiality only attached to information 
"gained in" the professional relationship that the client requested to 
be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or 
detrimental to the client.22 The new rule sought to protect informa-
tion even if it was acquired before or after the attorney-client relation-
ship existed. Moreover, the new rule did not require the information 
to be embarrassing or detrimental to the client; all information was 
covered. Second, under the old Model Code, a lawyer was permitted 
("may reveal") to reveal the intention of the client to commit any 
crime and to reveal the information necessary to prevent any crime.23 
The proposed rule only permitted the lawyer to reveal information 
about the client to prevent the client from committing a crime that 
would result in death, substantial bodily harm, or substantial financial 
injury. Third, under the Model Code, the lawyer was required to re-
veal information necessary to rectify a fraud upon a person.24 The 
21. MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, at 25. 
22. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(A). 
23. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(3). 
24. MODEL CODE DR 7-102(B)(1). 
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new proposed rule only permitted disclosure in such a situation; it did 
not require disclosure. 
Despite the fact that the Kutak Commission's proposed Rule 1.6 
expanded the confidentiality obligations of an attorney from those of 
the Model Code, proposed Rule 1.6 was rejected by the ABA House 
of Delegates because it did not go far enough in expanding the duty of 
confidentiality. The final rule as adopted by the ABA deleted the ex-
ceptions in (b )(2) and (b)( 4). Most significant to this symposium is 
that the ABA rejected requiring an attorney to make disclosure of a 
client's fraud in order to rectify the consequences of such fraud. In-
stead the ABA adopted a rule that prohibits such disclosure. This 
shift in position was not without controversy. Many believed it was 
inconsistent with the prevailing post-Watergate view that more se-
crecy was not preferable. The position that prevailed within the ABA, 
however, was that a broad confidentiality rule best served the public 
interest. The Comments to Rule 1.6 included the following points: 
• A broad confidentiality rule facilitates the full development of 
facts essential to the proper representation of the client; 
• A broad confidentiality rule encourages people to seek early le-
gal assistance; 
• A broad confidentiality rule encourages clients to communicate 
fully and frankly; 
• A broad confidentiality rule leads to better compliance with the 
law because almost all clients follow the advice given by their 
attorney; and 
• The public is better protected if full and open communication by 
the client is encouraged.25 
These arguments did not convince everyone that Model Rule 1.6 as 
adopted by the ABA was the appropriate solution. Those within the 
ABA who supported a broader disclosure rule were able to have the 
following comment adopted: "Rule 1.6 [does not prevent] the lawyer 
[when required to withdraw under Rule 1.13 "Organization as Cli-
ent"] from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may 
also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the 
like."26 This comment is known as the "noisy withdrawal comment." 
Although ABA Model Rule 1.6 does not permit disclosure of any in-
formation regarding the reason for withdrawal, the comment permits 
the lawyer to disclose the fact of withdrawal. This disclosure in fact 
may serve as a warning that a problem exists, but the actual problem 
cannot be disclosed. 
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer R. 1.6 cmt. (2001), reprinted in MORGAN & Ro. 
TUNDA, supra note 17, at 26-32. 
26. See Letter from Thomas D. Morgan, Professor, George Washington University Law 
School, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), at 
http://www.SEC.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/tdmorgan040703.htm. 
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The ABA's position on confidentiality as adopted in Model Rule 
1.6 was generally not well received. The majority of states refused to 
adopt Model Rule 1.6.27 Some states adopted the Kutak Commis-
sion's proposal as their rule. Other states adopted a confidentiality 
rule based on the Model Code which required disclosure in certain 
situations. In 1991, based in part on the negative response which 
Model Rule 1.6 had received since its adoption, a special committee of 
the ABA recommended to the ABA House of Delegates that it adopt 
a new Model Rule 1.6 which would add the language permitting dis-
closure of client fraud as originally proposed by the Kutak Commis-
sion. The House of Delegates once again rejected this proposal. 
Another ABA Commission, known as the Ethics 2000 Commis-
sion, was formed near the end of the 1990s to reevaluate the Model 
Rules. This Commission found that the current Model Rule 1.6 as 
adopted in 1983 was "out of step with public policy and the values of 
the legal profession as reflected in the rules currently in force in most 
jurisdictions."28 The Ethics 2000 Commission's recommendation was 
that disclosure should be permitted (but not required) "to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client from 
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in sub-
stantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's ser-
vices. "29 When this proposal was presented to the ABA House of 
Delegates, it too was rejected. 
Along with the legal profession, Congress reacted to the Water-
gate scandal. The federal government's response to Watergate fo-
cused on reform of the election process and the prosecution of those 
involved in political corruption. For example, Congress in 1974 
amended the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act.30 The 1974 
amendments created a new federal administrative agency, the Federal 
Election Commission. The 1974 amendments also imposed limits on 
contributions by individuals to federal political campaigns. Watergate 
also led Congress to pass the Ethics in Government Act of 197831 
which created a special process to appoint an independent counsel 
(special prosecutor) to investigate and prosecute violations of federal 
27. Forty·one states did not adopt ABA Model Rule 1.6. See STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. 
SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS, STATUTES AND STANDARDS 83-87 (2003). 
28. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 
71,670, 71,693 n.72 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 CF.R. pI. 205), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm. 
29. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 27, at 8l. 
30. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stal. 1263 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000». 
31. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 118a, 288, 288a-
288m, 5 U.S.C App. 4 §§ 101-111, 401-408, 501-505, 28 U.S.C §§ 49, 528, 529, 591-598, 1365 
(1994». 
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law by certain high-ranking federal government officials.32 Watergate 
also led Congress to pass amendments to the Freedom of Information 
Act33 with the complementary goals of creating a more open govern-
ment and providing journalists with a statutory tool to aid their inves-
tigative reporting which had been so significant in unraveling the 
Watergate story. Statutes such as the War Powers Resolution34 and 
the Presidential Records Act of 197835 can also be traced in part to the 
post-Watergate attitude toward the Office of the President.36 The 
post-Watergate years also saw a push for an increase in penalties for 
those convicted of white collar crimes, especially for those who had 
been involved in misconduct as public officials.37 
Significant to this symposium is that despite all the reform efforts 
by the federal government after Watergate, and despite the strong 
criticism of lawyers during Watergate, the federal government did not 
itself seek to regulate the legal profession. Rather, as discussed 
above, reforms in the legal profession in response to Watergate were 
spearheaded by the ABA, the state courts and the state bar associa-
tions. During the post-Watergate period, the federal government did 
not attempt to displace the traditional regulators of the legal profes-
sion despite the attacks aimed at lawyers during this time. Although 
some of the decisions of the traditional regulators were criticized by 
persons inside and outside of government, the legitimacy of the state 
courts and the state and national bar associations as the rightful regu-
lators of the legal profession was not challenged by the federal 
government. 
IV. ENRON AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S 
REGULATION OF LAWYERS 
Thirty years after the Watergate scandal, the nation learned of 
another scandal - this one not involving government officials but cor-
porate officials who along with their accountants, bankers, and per-
haps attorneys, engaged in financial misconduct. This misconduct led 
to the loss of billions of dollars by investors, especially employees who 
had their retirement accounts invested in their employer's stock. 
While the Enron scandal primarily involved misconduct by corporate 
management and accountants, lawyers also came under scrutiny for 
32. Id. 
33. Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (2002». 
34. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.c. §§ 1541-1548 
(2002». 
35. Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified at 44 U.S.c. §§ 2201-2207 (2000». 
36. See Carl M. Cannon, Why Reagan Papers Aren't Being Released, NAT'L J., May 19, 
2001. 
37. See generally George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us - Salinas, Sun Diamond, 
and Two Views of the Anticorruption Model, 74 TuL. L. REV. 747 (2000). 
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their role in the fraudulent schemes of their corporate clients. Remi-
niscent of the Watergate era, lawyers were criticized for not doing 
more (or anything) to prevent the scandal and the losses that resulted. 
Some argued that the lawyers should have disclosed to the authorities, 
in particular the SEC, the corporate misconduct of which the lawyers 
must have been aware or, at least, should have been aware. Once 
again, as during Watergate, two central issues were at the forefront: 
what is the role of an attorney for an organization, and what is the 
proper rule of confidentiality in the situation where counsel for an 
organization is aware of misconduct that will cause substantial injury 
to others. 
Congress' major response to the Enron scandal was the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200238 which was signed into law by President Bush on 
July 30, 2002. Reminiscent of Congress' creation of the Federal Elec-
tion Commission after Watergate, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a 
new administrative agency - the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board.39 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also required enhanced dis-
closures about financial matters and conflicts of interest40 comparable 
to the disclosure laws involving campaign finance enacted after Water-
gate. Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandated increased pen-
alties for white-collar crimes,41 again similar to Congress' response to 
Watergate. But, Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did something 
which was not part of the post-Watergate reform - direct federal reg-
ulation of the legal profession. It is this aspect of Congress' reaction 
to the Enron scandal that is most significant to this symposium. 
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC to issue 
rules setting minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys 
appearing and practicing before the SEC in the representation of issu-
ers. Section 307 was not part of the original bill reported out of the 
Senate Banking Committee. Rather, it was introduced on the Senate 
floor by Senator John Edwards of North Carolina, himself a lawyer, 
and co-sponsored by Senator John Corzine of New Jersey and Senator 
Michael Enzi of Wyoming. Edwards' amendment was prompted by 
an exchange of letters between a group of law professors and the SEC 
following the revelations of the Enron scanda1.42 A letter had been 
38. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 78d-3, 780-6, 7201, 7202, 
7211-7219,7231-7234,7241-7246,7261-7266,18 U.S.C. §§ 1348-1350, 1514A, 1519, 1520 (2002». 
39. Id., 116 Stat. 750 (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 7211). 
40. Id., 116 Stat. 785, 789, 790 (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 7261-7266). 
41. White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, PUb. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
805 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 1341, 1343, 1349, 28 U.S.c. § 994, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 
(2002». See Carrie Johnson, Panel Boosts Penalties for White-Collar Offenses, WASH. POST, Jan. 
9, 2003, at E1. 
42. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 
71,670,71,673 (proposed Dec. 2,2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm. 
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sent to the then-SEC chairman Harvey Pitt urging the SEC to impose 
an "up the ladder" reporting rule on attorneys for public corporations. 
This proposed rule would require attorneys who learned of miscon-
duct at public companies to report such misconduct to the manage-
ment of the company. The then-General Counsel of the SEC 
responded to this letter. His response was that although he did not 
disagree with the proposal, this "significant change in established 
practice" was more appropriate for Congressional action, as opposed 
to agency rulemaking.43 When this correspondence came to the atten-
tion of Senator Edwards, he proposed the amendment to the pending 
legislation. This amendment was subsequently enacted as section 307. 
Although the legislative history on section 307 is sparse, comments by 
the co-sponsors indicate that their goal in section 307 was to prevent 
lawyers from "sitting idly by" while with their knowledge their clients 
committed fraud. 44 In the Senators' view, inaction by lawyers made it 
possible for corporate managers to perpetrate the Enron and other 
corporate scandals. 
Section 307 settled an old debate over the SEC's authority to reg-
ulate the professional conduct of attorneys. In 1935, the SEC adopted 
Rule 2( e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice (later renumbered Rule 
102( e)) in which the SEC gave itself the authority to initiate discipli-
nary proceedings against attorneys who lacked integrity or compe-
tence, engaged in improper professional conduct or who violated 
federal securities law.45 Sanctions for violating Rule 102(e) included 
censure, suspension and permanent bar to practicing before the SEC. 
This SEC rule was controversial, in part, because it had been adopted 
without express statutory authority.46 For example, in 1981, the SEC 
in In re Carter47 reversed an administrative law judge's (AU) decision 
that two attorneys who failed to correct misstatements in a client's 
press release and SEC filings concerning its earnings had aided and 
abetted their client's securities law violation. The SEC's decision to 
reverse the ALJ's decision was based on its conclusion that the attor-
neys' conduct was not "unambiguously" prohibited.48 The SEC, how-
ever, then announced that in future cases, it would interpret Rule 
102( e) to require an attorney who learned of his client's violation of 
43. Id. 
44. See David M. Becker & Melissa Johns, New Ethical Duties for Lawyers Under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, INSIGHTS, Nov. 2002, at 2. 
45. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71,671. Rule 102(e) does not establish any standards of professional care. It only enables the 
SEC to discipline professionals who have engaged in improper professional conduct as defined 
by a state ethical rule. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. 47 S.E.c. 471 (1981). 
48. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71,671-72. 
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SEC disclosure rules to take prompt steps to end the client's noncom-
pliance. Such prompt steps included a "direct approach to the board 
of directors" or management.49 In its Carter decision, the SEC also 
stated that it would seek comments from the public regarding whether 
this interpretation of Rule 102( e) should be expanded or modified. 
The SEC's announcement of its interpretation of an attorney's obliga-
tion in this securities setting was heavily criticized by the private bar.50 
Although the SEC never backed off its Carter interpretation of Rule 
102( e), the SEC's general counsel at a subsequent time expressed con-
cern that the SEC lacked the time or expertise to fashion a code of 
professional conduct for attorneys practicing before it.51 The SEC's 
general counsel further stated that Rule 102 ( e) proceedings should 
only be initiated where the attorney's conduct was a violation of es-
tablished state law or established state professional misconduct 
rules.52 In the years that followed, although the SEC in individual 
cases stated that lawyers appearing before it had an obligation to re-
port corporate misconduct to the board of directors and/or officers, 
the SEC never adopted formal standards requiring such action.53 This 
lack of action was in part based on the uncertainty of whether the 
SEC had the power to adopt such standards. Section 307 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act eliminated any such uncertainty. For the first 
time the SEC was expressly authorized - in fact, mandated - to 
promulgate rules regulating attorney professional conduct. 
Section 307's specific mandate to the SEC was that it 
issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, 
setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attor-
neys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in 
the representation of issuers, including a rule: 
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material viola-
tion of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar viola-
tion by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal 
counselor the chief executive officer of the company (or the 
equivalent thereof); and 
(2) if the counselor officer does not appropriately respond to the 
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures 
or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney 
to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of 
directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of 
49. Carter, 47 S.E.c. at 512. 
50. Id. 
51. See Edward F. Greene, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings Before the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, Remarks to the New York County Lawyers' Association (Jan. 18, 1982), in 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 83,089 (1982); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 71,672. 
52. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71,672. 
53. Id. 
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directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly or 
indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.54 
In response to this statutory mandate, the SEC on November 21, 2002 
published proposed rules in the Federal Register. Comments in re-
sponse to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking were required to be 
received on or before December 18, 2002. Importantly, the proposed 
rules included not only the mandated "up-the-Iadder" reporting re-
quirement but also other rules which the SEC admitted "are not ex-
plicitly required by Section 307."55 Among the proposals not 
explicitly required was a "noisy withdrawal" proposal. This proposal 
requires attorneys under certain circumstances to notify the SEC that 
they had withdrawn from their representation of a securities issuer 
and permits the attorney to report evidence of client misconduct to 
the SEC, even if such disclosure is in violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct in the attorney's state.56 
In other respects, the SEC also took an expansive view of its 
power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys. For example, 
the SEC's definition of "appearing and practicing" before the SEC as 
used in section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act covered attorneys who 
not only transact business with the SEC57 or represent an issuer in an 
SEC administrative proceeding or in connection with any SEC investi-
gation, inquiry, information request or subpoena,58 but also any attor-
ney who provides advice with respect to the United States securities 
laws or SEC's rules or regulations regarding any document that the 
attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated 
into any document that will be filed with or submitted to the SEC. 59 
This last group of attorneys could include attorneys who are not secur-
ities lawyers but who provide information to securities lawyers about 
a matter within their area of work, e.g., a litigator who responds to a 
request about the status of litigation involving the issuer. The broad 
reach of the SEC's regulation of the legal profession is also evidenced 
in the fact that the SEC rules cover attorney conduct not only related 
to a client's violation of federal securities laws, but also to any "breach 
of fiduciary duty" including those based solely on state common law.60 
The SEC has also admitted that its definition of the phrase "in the 
54. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
55. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71,671. 
56. Id. at 71,673; see also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attor-
neys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed Jan. 29, 2003) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 205, 240, 249), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm. 
57. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the 
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(i) (2003). 
58. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(ii). 
59. Id. § 205.2(a)(iii). 
60. Id. § 205.2( d). 
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representation of an issuer"61 is a "broad definition."62 Moreover, the 
phrase "evidence of a material violation" as used in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was defined by the SEC to mean "credible evidence, based 
upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a 
prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably 
likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to 
occur,"63 as compared to a requirement of actual knowledge by an 
attorney. The SEC also adopted a regulation that governs the profes-
sional relationship between subordinate attorneys64 and their super-
vising attorney.65 
The details of the federal government's approach to the profes-
sional obligations of attorneys are discussed by others in this sympo-
sium and will not be repeated here. More important to this article 
than any particular proposal or adopted rule is the role the federal 
government has adopted for itself in the regulation of the legal profes-
sion. Through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC's actions pursu-
ant to it, the federal government has thrust itself into the leadership 
position on attorney professional responsibility issues. These issues 
have long been the province of the states and the legal profession it-
self. Of utmost significance is that the federal government has now 
sought to resolve the complex issue of the proper role of an attorney 
for an organization when the attorney learns of misconduct by the 
corporate client - an issue which has been the subject of an ongoing 
debate for decades within the legal profession.66 Although the SEC 
has written that it does "not intend to supplant state ethics laws un-
necessarily,"67 the SEC has also stated that its rules would preempt 
any state law that is not as rigorous as its own.68 Thus, the federal 
government's position is the position for the legal profession. 
The federal government has justified its "robust" approach69 to 
the regulation of the legal profession on various grounds. The federal 
government believes that "existing state ethical rules have not proven 
to be an effective deterrent to attorney misconduct."7o The federal 
61. [d. § 205.2(a). 
62. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 
71,670, 71,678 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm. 
63. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e). 
64. [d. § 205.5. 
65. [d. § 205.4. 
66. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 
at 71,673. 
67. [d. 
68. 17 C.F.R. § 205, available at www.sec.gov/rules/finaI/33-8185.htm. 
69. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71,673. 
70. [d. at 71,671; Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Se-
curities Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 205, 240, 249), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm. 
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government's approach will "deter instances of attorney and issuer 
misconduct and where misconduct has occurred, minimize its impact 
upon issuers and their shareholders."71 Further, the federally-im-
posed attorney conduct rules "should protect investors by helping to 
prevent instances of significant corporation misconduct and fraud,"72 
because the SEC "believes that [the rules] will make it more likely 
that companies will address instances of misconduct internally, and act 
to remedy violations at earlier stages. "73 The SEC's position is that its 
approach "should serve to deter corporate misconduct and fraud. 
Corporate wrongdoers at the lower or middle levels of the corporate 
hierarchy will be aware that an attorney who becomes aware of their 
misconduct is obligated under the rule to report it up-the-Iadder to the 
highest levels of the corporation. "74 The SEC also believes that its 
approach "should boost investor confidence in the financial markets 
... [because it] will enhance the proper functioning of the capital mar-
kets and promote efficiency by reducing the likelihood that illegal be-
havior would remain undetected and unremedied for long periods of 
time."75 
It is thus seen that the response of the federal government to the 
Enron scandal and other recent financial scandals is much different 
than its response to the Watergate scandal. In response to Enron, the 
federal government sought to directly regulate and redefine the attor-
ney-client relationship. It is clear from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the SEC's actions pursuant to it that, unlike after Watergate, the fed-
eral government is not going to permit the debate and proposals for 
reform to take place exclusively within the legal profession and the 
state courts. As discussed earlier, after the Watergate scandal, it was 
the ABA, the state bar associations and the state courts that re-
sponded to the criticism of lawyers. Today, however, the organized 
bar and state courts are not being relied upon to respond to the Enron 
scandal. During the debate over section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, Senator Edwards stated that "[w]ith Enron and Worldcom, and 
all the other corporate misconduct we have seen, it is again clear that 
corporate lawyers should not be left to regulate themselves .... "76 
Senator Enzi added that "the State bars as a whole have failed ... . 
Even if they do have a general rule that applies, it often goes unen-
71. [d. 
72. 17 C.F.R. § 205, available at www.sec.gov/rules/finaI/33-8185.htm. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. 148 CONGo REC. S6552 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards); Senate 
Passes Amendment to Accounting Bill Requiring Corporate Lawyers to Report Fraud, 18 Laws. 
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAfBNA) No. 15, at 433 (July 17, 2002); see also Becker & Johns, 
supra note 44, at 2-10. 
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forced."77 SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt remarked that "Sarbanes-
Oxley reflects some skepticism about the degree to which the legal 
profession can police itself."78 Pitt also complained that state discipli-
nary authorities had "done nothing" in response to referrals by the 
SEC about particular lawyers. He warned that if the state bars will 
not discipline securities lawyers, the SEC "will assume the task. "79 
The Enron scandal has led to the biggest step toward the federali-
zation of the regulation of the legal profession in the history of the 
legal profession. The federal government now believes that it should 
decide the controversial issues of confidentiality and attorney loyalty 
to an organizational client that previously have been debated and de-
cided by the profession itself and by the state courtS.80 Although 
some of the conclusions of the federal government are in accord with 
those arrived at by the profession itself and by the states,81 the federal 
government has decided some of the issues differently. For example, 
the prevailing rule among the states concerning an attorney's obliga-
tion to an organizational client is based on ABA Model Rule 1.13. 
The ABA Model Rule suggests various remedial approaches - for 
example, a lawyer may ask for reconsideration; a lawyer may advise 
getting a separate legal opinion; a lawyer may refer the matter to 
higher authority in the organization - but requires none. The federal 
government approach, on the other hand, is to mandate certain action 
- "the attorney shall report" material violations to certain persons or 
committees set forth in the statute.82 Furthermore, the ABA Model 
Rules and the rules adopted by the states do not set different stan-
dards for lawyers who work within the organization and for lawyers 
who are outside counsel. The federal government's approach seeks to 
create different obligations for inside and outside counsel.83 Addi-
77. 148 CONGo REc. S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi). 
78. See James Podgers, Seeking the Best Route, 88 A.B.A. J. 68 (2002) (quoting Harvey Pitt, 
Speech to the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association (Sept. 20, 2002»; see also 
Letter from JUdith S. Kaye, President, Conference of Chief Justices, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secre-
tary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 13,2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s74502/jskayel.htm. 
79. Rachel McTague, Pitt Says SEC Will Take On Assignment of Disciplining Lawyers if 
State Bars Do Not, 18 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 20, at 591 (Sept. 25, 2002); 
see also Rachel McTague, Pitt Sees Benefits in New Federal Mandate for Lawyers to Report Se-
curities Violations, 18 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 17, at 480 (Aug. 14,2002). 
80. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 
71,670,71,673 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (stating that SEC 
proposals "embody ethical principles that legal commentators and the ABA have been consider-
ing for years"), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm. 
81. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.4. This regulation, "Responsibilities of Supervisory Attor-
neys," is based on ABA Model Rule 5.1, and 17 c.F.R. § 205.5, "Responsibilities of a 
Subordinate Attorney" is based in part on ABA Model Rule 5.2. 
82. 17 c.F.R. § 205.3(b). 
83. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
205, 240, 249), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm. Compare proposed 17 
C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(iii)(A) ("An attorney retained by the issuer shall withdraw from representing 
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tionally, the prevailing rule among the states based on the ABA 
Model Rules focuses on whether an attorney for an organization 
"knows" of corporate misconduct.84 The SEC rejected an "actual 
knowledge" standard as inconsistent with section 307's emphasis on 
the public interest and protecting investors.85 The adoption of an ob-
jective standard by the SEC rather than an actual knowledge standard 
is very significant. Establishing that a lawyer "knows" of his client's 
misconduct is usually difficult to prove. An actual knowledge stan-
dard provides more discretion to the attorney on how to respond to 
information indicating misconduct by the client. This issue was critical 
in the Watergate case when Mardian argued that because he did not 
"know" the true facts of the Watergate break-in, his conduct as an 
attorney for CRP was proper. In the corporate setting, lawyers for 
issuers will not have as much flexibility as lawyers have traditionally 
been granted in deciding how to respond to information of client 
misconduct. 
The federal government's response to the Enron scandal also re-
flects its position that every attorney owes an obligation to the public 
separate from an attorney's obligation to his client. This position was 
the subject of many critical comments filed with the SEC. For exam-
ple, the law firm Jones Day commented that the "touchstone of the 
attorney's professional and ethical obligation is the attorney's duty to 
the client, not some undefined duty to the market or public investors, 
and especially not the government agency that can among other roles 
bring an enforcement proceeding against the client. "86 A former 
member of the SEC commented that the SEC has "enlisted lawyers as 
law enforcement officers, changing their allegiance from their clients 
to the SEC. "87 The ABA Journal published an article about corporate 
lawyers and corporate accountability titled "Junior G-Men."88 Other 
comments emphasized that attorneys are advocates, not independent 
the issuer, and shall notify the issuer, in writing, that the withdrawal is based on professional 
consideration.") with proposed 17 c.F.R. § 20S.3(d)(iii)(B) ("An attorney employed by the is-
suer shall cease forthwith any participation or assistance in any matter," but withdrawal from 
representation in all matters is not required.). 
See Letter from Richard w. Painter, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law 
School, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 12, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74S02/painter1.htm. 
84. The SEC used an actual knowledge standard to trigger a duty to report in In re Carter, 
47 S.E.C. 471 (1981). See E-mail from Roberta S. Karmel, Professor, Brooklyn Law School, to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 12,2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74S02/karmeI1.htm. 
8S. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71,682. 
86. See Letter from Jones Day, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74S02/jones-
day040703.htm. 
87. See Karmel, supra note 84. 
88. John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men: Corporate Lawyers Worry That They're Doing the Gov-
ernment's Bidding While Doing Internal Investigations, 89 A.B.A. J. 46 (2003). 
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auditors,89 and that the SEC position was a significant change in how 
attorneys always have understood their role in society.90 
Although the same issue of an attorney's duty to the public when 
the attorney learns of client misconduct which will cause harm to the 
public was also critical to the Watergate scandal, Watergate did not 
lead to any serious attempt to require attorneys to go to the prosecu-
tion and confess their clients' misdeeds. The current view of the fed-
eral government therefore represents an important shift in the view of 
an attorney's role in society. As another commenter remarked in crit-
icism of the SEC's proposals, "lawyers are not supposed to exercise 
leverage or power over clients by threatening to disclose client 
secrets. "91 
There are other indications that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
started a movement towards the federalization of the regulation of the 
legal profession. During the rulemaking process, the SEC stated that 
whether an attorney-client relationship exists for purposes of the rules 
"will be a federal question. "92 State law "will not be controlling. "93 
The SEC also has stated that in the event that an attorney's conduct 
violates its rules as well as a state rule of professional conduct, the 
SEC may bring a proceeding against the attorney regardless of 
whether a state disciplinary proceeding was initiated.94 Moreover, the 
SEC's position is that "even if a state ethics board or a court were to 
determine in an action not brought by the [SEC] that an attorney 
complied with [the SEC Rules] ... that determination would not pre-
clude the [SEC] from bringing either an enforcement action or a disci-
plinary proceeding against that attorney for a violation of [the SEC 
Rules] based on the same conduct. "95 It seems that the Sarbanes-
89. See Letter from Seventy-Nine Law Firms, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls74502/ 
79Iawfirms1.htm. 
90. See Rachel McTague, Lawyers' Confidentiality Isn't Absolute, According to SEC Com-
missioner Goldschmid, 18 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABNBNA) No. 25, at 723 (Dec. 4, 
2002) ("[I]t is the first time that a lawyer might be compelled to report information outside the 
organizational structure of his client."); Letter from Barry Nagler, Chairman of the Advocacy 
Committee, ACCA's Board of Directors, and M. Elizabeth Wall, Chair, ACCA's Board of Di-
rectors, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls74502/acca040703.htm; Susan Hackett, SEC 
Takes Aim, Misfires, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at 20 (stating that SEC rules "change the 
design of our ethics rules ... from a focus on prohibiting lawyers from getting involved in or 
facilitating client misconduct to a focus on making lawyers responsible for rooting out client 
misconduct"); Otis Bilodeau, SEC Rules on Lawyers Draw Flak, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002; 
see also E-mail from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/sul-
livan040703.htm. 
91. See Nagler & Wall, supra note 90. 
92. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003), available at www.sec.gov/rules/finaU33-8185.htm. 
93. Id. 
94. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 
71,670, 71,697 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm. 
95. 17 C.F.R. § 205, available at www.sec.gov/rules/finaU33-8185.htm. 
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Oxley Act has started the federalization of the attorney disciplinary 
process. 
The federal government's response to the Enron scandal is also a 
triumph of the legislative and executive branches of government over 
the judicial branch of government. In most states, the power to regu-
late attorneys is vested in the highest state court. The power to adopt 
rules of professional conduct and the power to enforce them through 
the disciplinary system is vested in the judicial branch. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the SEC's role pursuant to it signify the rejection of the 
exclusive power of the judicial branch to regulate the legal profession. 
V. THE LEGAL PROFESSION'S RESPONSE TO ENRON 
As discussed earlier in this article, in response to the Watergate 
scandal, the ABA and the state bar associations after considering vari-
ous reforms eventually adopted new model rules of professional con-
duct. In response to the Enron scandal, the ABA created a special 
committee, the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, to examine 
the ethical principles governing the roles of lawyers and corporate of-
ficials. 96 In its Preliminary Report to the ABA, the Task Force criti-
cized corporate lawyers for "turning a blind eye to the natural 
consequences of what they observe."97 The Task Force then made va-
rious recommendations. One recommendation was that the ABA 
adopt the Ethics 2000 recommendation that Model Rule 1.6 be 
amended to permit disclosure of information to rectify the conse-
quences of a client's fraudulent act that the lawyer's services were 
used to further. The Task Force also recommended that disclosure be 
required to prevent a serious crime from being committed.98 The Task 
Force further recommended that Model Rule 1.13 be amended to re-
quire an attorney to take certain remedial actions rather than only to 
permit such actions. The Task Force criticized the current version of 
Rule 1.13 because it "unduly emphasized avoidance of disruption to 
96. Robert Hirshon, President of the American Bar Association, charged the Task Force as 
follows: 
The Task Force on Corporate Responsibility shall examine systemic issues relating to 
corporate responsibility arising out of the unexpected and traumatic bankruptcy of En-
ron and other Enron-like situations. . . . The Task Force will examine the framework 
of laws and regulations and ethical principles governing the roles of lawyers, executive 
officers, directors, and other key participants. 
Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 
[hereinafter Task Force Report], at http://www.abanet.orglbuslaw/corporateresponsibility/prelim-
inary_report.pdf (July 16, 2002); see also Martha Neil, Task Forces Forge Ahead, 88 AB.A J. 68 
(2002); Bart Schwartz & Jonathan Freedman, The SEC Wants Noisier Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 
12, 2002, at 5. 
97. Task Force Report, supra note 96, at 35. 
98. See Task Force Proposes Model Rule Changes for Lawyer Response to Corporate 
Wrongs, 18 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 16, at 458 (July 31, 2002). 
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the corporation while playing down the more important goal of mini-
mizing harm. "99 
In light of the ABA Task Force's report and recommendations, 
various commenters, including the ABA and the Association of State 
Supreme Court Judges, asked the SEC to not adopt rules of profes-
sional conduct until after the ABA and the states had the opportunity 
to revisit its rules in response to the Enron scandal. In their com-
ments to the SEC, the state supreme court judges emphasized that the 
state courts have been the traditional ultimate authority for the pro-
mulgation and enforcement of rules of attorney conduct. They urged 
the SEC to wait and allow the state courts to deal with these issues. lOO 
The ABA also argued to the SEC that changes to the rules of profes-
sional conduct should occur through "historically established mecha-
nisms."101 Another commenter pointed out that the ABA rules had 
been drafted by "presumably ethical people" and had been thought by 
"generations of serious, thoughtful attorneys to provide sufficient 
standards of professional conduct. "102 Just because the ABA had cho-
sen to "strike the balance between conflicting interests in a way differ-
ent from the balance" favored by the SEC, this did not justify the 
SEC's actions.103 The SEC's response was that it was "not appropri-
ate for it to wait for further developments" because there is "no evi-
dence when, if ever, state supreme courts (or legislative bodies) will 
revisit these issues."104 Unlike after Watergate, the federal govern-
ment was unwilling to allow the states and the ABA to lead the re-
form effort. 
In August 2003, one year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became 
law and seven months after the SEC adopted the "up-the-Iadder" rule 
and republished for further comment the "noisy withdrawal" rule, but 
before the SEC had taken final action on the "noisy withdrawal" pro-
posal, the ABA House of Delegates adopted changes to Model Rule 
1.6 and Model Rule 1.13. Interestingly, two years earlier, the House 
of Delegates had refused to adopt almost identical changes. By a vote 
99. Task Force Report, supra note 96, at 28; see E-mail from William H. Simon, Saunders 
Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Dec. 13,2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/simonI21302. 
htm. Model Rule 1.13 is "notoriously ambiguous." Id. 
100. Kaye, supra note 78. 
101. See Joan C. Rogers & Rachel McTague, SEC Must Issue Attorney Conduct Rules Under 
New Federal Accounting Reform Law, 18 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) No. 16, at 
457 (July 31, 2002). 
102. E-mail from Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Senior Vice President & General Counsel, 
ClENA Corporation, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Apr. 6, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls74502Irbstevenson1.htm. 
103. Id. 
104. 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003), available at www.sec.gov/rules/finaI/33-8185.htm. 
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of 218 to 201,105 the House of Delegates amended Model Rule 1.6 to 
permit (but not require) a lawyer to reveal confidential information if 
the client was using the lawyer's services to commit a crime or fraud 
that would cause substantial injury to the financial interests of others. 
By a vote of 239 to 147,106 the House of Delegates amended Model 
Rule 1.13 to require lawyers for organizations to report unlawful con-
duct by employees of the organization to the top officials of the organ-
ization. Model Rule 1.13 was also amended to permit a lawyer to 
disclose confidential information to persons outside the organization 
if the highest officials in the organization failed to address a clear vio-
lation of the law, and the lawyer reasonably believed that the violation 
was reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organiza-
tion.l07 Opposition to these changes was based not only on traditional 
arguments in favor of a broad confidentiality rule, but also because of 
the view that the ABA had succumbed to pressure from the federal 
government.108 Even some who voted in favor of the amendments did 
so not based on their view of the proper parameters of the attorney-
client relationship, but based on their fear that to ignore the federal 
government's recent pronouncements would lead to the end of the 
ability of the legal profession to regulate itself.109 
VI. POSSIBLE CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE 
With any attempt at reform there is the possibility that unin-
tended consequences will lead to results contrary to the public inter-
est. With the hindsight of thirty years, several unintended 
consequences of the Watergate reform movement can now be identi-
105. A voice vote was first held, but it was so close that a manual vote count was required. 
See Jason Hoppin, Crime and Punishment at ABA Meeting, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 18,2003, at 12. 
106. Id. 
107. A proposal to require disclosure in such circumstances was not adopted. See Patricia 
Manson, Lawyer-Ethics Code Undergoes Sea Change, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 12,2003, at 1. 
108. Lawrence J. Fox, a lawyer from Philadelphia, commented, "I think this is a sad day for 
confidentiality and a sad day for the ABA. We've succumbed to outside pressures from people 
in government, and it is not the role of the ABA to succumb to outside opinion." Asher Haw-
kins, ABA Amends Two Rules to Fight Corporate Fraud, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 13,2002, 
at 3. 
109. See Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyers Pressed to Give Up Ground on Client Secrets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at A16 ("[T]he real issue is less about the administration of justice and 
more about lawyers' desire to avoid regulation."); see also Hawkins, supra note 108 ("[A] lot of 
it is reaction to the WorldComs and Enrons and fear that if we don't do something, someone else 
will .... We want to maintain as a self-regulatory profession, and this was the result."); Abraham 
Reich, Confidentiality Principle Not Inviolate, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 6, 2003, at 7. 
Id. 
One of the unique hallmarks of our profession has been self-regulation .... In fact, it is 
no coincidence that after the ABA House of Delegates, in 2001, rejected the proposals 
of the Ethics 2000 Commission [containing similar permissive disclosures now ad-
vanced by the task force], the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted. There is little doubt 
that Section 307 of that act may be the most pernicious attempt to regulate, at the 
federal level, the conduct of lawyers. Further, federal regulation may be just around 
the corner. 
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fied. For example, the creation of the Office of Special Prosecutor led 
to numerous very expensive investigations, few of which resulted in 
meaningful prosecutions.1 10 Displeasure with this reform measure led 
both political parties to support its termination.111 Additionally, limi-
tations on individual campaign contributions enacted as a Watergate 
reform led to the influence of "soft money" contributions which may 
be more corrupting of the election process than large individual con-
tributions.112 This "unintended consequence" of individual campaign 
limits was also the subject of subsequent legislation,113 albeit decades 
later. It has also been argued that another Watergate reform, the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978, has had a chilling effect on the Pres-
ident's ability to solicit candid advice.1 14 Post-Watergate amendments 
to the Freedom of Information Act have seemingly proven more help-
ful to unintended beneficiaries such as corporations and prisoners 
than journalists and the general public.115 The cost to the taxpayers of 
the Freedom of Information Act has also greatly exceeded 
predictions.116 
There are several possible unintended consequences of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC rules. One major concern is less 
compliance with the securities laws which will lead to more corporate 
scandals and less investor confidence in the capital markets.117 There 
are several reasons for this concern. The SEC rules seek to regulate 
not only attorneys directly involved in securities matters but also non-
110. See Turning Back; Undoing Watergate Reforms, TIME, June 1, 1981, at 28 (stating that 
the Office of Special Prosecutor led to "long, sensationalized and fruitless investigations"). 
111. The special prosecutor office died on June 30, 1999 when Congress refused to extend 
the 1978 independent counsel statute. See Richard E. Cohen, Watergate-Era Laws, R.I.P., NAT'L 
J., Aug. 21, 1999, at 2431 (stating that over the years, Watergate reforms have become relics); see 
also Francine Kiefer, Watergate Reforms Fade, 30 Years Later, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 
17,2002, at 1. 
112. See Gail Russell Chaddock, Can Campaign Finance Really Be Reformed?, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 2001, at 2 (quoting former Senator William Brock as saying, "When we 
passed new laws in the days of Watergate, we were trying to get rid of the excesses of the early 
1970s .... But we created a whole new set of monsters - the most pernicious was the explosion 
of soft money"). 
113. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (to be 
codified at 2 U.S.c. §§ 438a, 441a-1, 441i, 441k, 36 U.S.c. § 510). 
114. See Cannon, supra note 36. 
115. See Turning Back; Undoing Watergate Reforms, supra note 110, at 28. FOIA intended 
to open Government records to citizens' groups, journalists and scholars. Instead, many more 
requests come from prisoners. Id. 
116. In 1974, Congress estimated that it would cost $100,000 annually to enforce FOIA; in 
1979. a survey indicated the law costs about $45 million. Id. 
117. See Nagler & Wall, supra note 90; supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also 
Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: A Bid to Regulate the Entire Bar, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 19, 
2002, at 3; Letter from American Corporate Counsel Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secre-
tary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s74502/acca040703.htm; Letter from Anthony Horan, Secretary, J.P. Morgan Chase & 
Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 9, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.govlrules/proposed/s74502/jpmorganchase040903.htm; E-mail from Seward 
& Kissel LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 8, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/seward1.htm. 
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securities lawyers whose practice is only incidental to securities mat-
ters.118 These lawyers include tax lawyers, intellectual property law-
yers and litigators who are often called upon to provide information to 
assist securities lawyers in preparing the SEC filings on behalf of their 
corporate clients.119 It has been suggested that the interest of inves-
tors will be harmed by the breadth of the SEC rules because non-
securities lawyers will avoid working with securities lawyers in order 
to avoid the impact of the rules which includes the mandatory with-
drawal from all representation of the client.120 This will lead to less 
disclosure of matters relevant to investors than if these lawyers were 
excluded from the SEC's rules of professional conduct. Similarly, it 
has been suggested that the proposed SEC rules may act as a disincen-
tive for issuers to use outside counsel in securities matters because of 
the possibility that the outside law firm will be required to withdraw 
from representing the issuer in non-securities matterspl For exam-
ple, if an outside law firm is representing an issuer in a securities mat-
ter and in an unrelated litigation matter, and withdrawal is required 
because of the securities issue, the firm must also withdraw from its 
representation of the issuer in the litigation matter. This will act as a 
disincentive to use outside counsel, who are generally viewed as being 
more independent and better in ferreting out corporate misconduct 
than in-house counsel. 
Another concern is that if the SEC's plans are fully implemented, 
there will be an adverse impact on the relationship between the attor-
ney and the corporate client.122 This will lead to more corporate mis-
conduct than under current rules of professional conduct. Candid 
discussions with counsel will be endangered out of the fear that the 
attorney will disclose these discussions to the government. If clients 
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 20S.2(a)(iii) (2003). 
119. See Karmel, supra note 84; Seventy-Nine Law Firms, supra note 89. 
120. See generally Letter from David M. Becker and Edward F. Greene, Cleary, Gottlieb, 
Steen & Hamilton, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 
16, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74S02/clearybec040703.htm; E-mail 
from Gerald S. Gackman, Chairman, Committee on Securities Regulation, Business Law Sec-
tion, New York State Bar Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Dec. 16, 200Z), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74S02/srcblsnysba040703. 
htm; Letter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro-
posed/s74S02/skaddenarps1.htm; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, supra note 90. 
121. E-mail from Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities 
and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7,2003), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74S02/carter 
040703.htm. 
122. See Leslie Wharton, Hazards for Attorney-Client Relationship: Sarbanes-Oxley Act's Re-
porting Requirements Pose Problems for Privileged Communications, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18,2002, at 
228; Letter from Jeff Bleich, President, The Bar Association of San Francisco, to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 3, 2003), available at www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s74S0Z/jbleich1.htm; E-mail from Henry A. McKinnell, Ph.D., The Business 
Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 8, 
2003), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74S02lbrt040803.htm; Seventy-Nine Law Firms, 
supra note 89. 
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are unwilling to confide in their attorneys, compliance with the securi-
ties laws will be weakened. This will further damage public confi-
dence in the securities market. The American Corporate Counsel 
Association (ACCA) submitted comments arguing that fraud is less 
likely to be discovered and remedied by corporate counsel "shut out 
of the client's inner circle because the client perceives [the attorney] 
to be a reporter or policeman for the government."123 The SEC's reg-
ulatory regime also has been described as contrary to the principles of 
preventive lawp4 If communication between client and lawyer will 
be less candid, the lawyer will lack the information needed to advise 
the client about how to comply with the law.125 
Another concern is that even though section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act does not create any private right of action, and the final 
rules as adopted by the SEC expressly provide that no private right of 
action is created,126 the SEC rules will be relevant in determining the 
standard of care in legal malpractice cases involving lawyers repre-
senting corporations. Expert testimony may be expected that the rea-
sonably prudent lawyer would have acted in accordance with section 
307 and the SEC rules. This may lead to increased liability for lawyers 
and increased cost of legal services. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Both the Watergate scandal and the Enron scandal drew atten-
tion to the role of attorneys who represent organizations which are 
involved in wrongdoing. In both situations, attorneys were criticized 
for not doing enough to prevent the wrongdoing or for acting in a 
manner that inhibited the public and the government from learning of 
the wrongdoing. Both scandals resulted in reforms that attempted to 
restore the public's confidence in the institutions that were involved in 
the scandals. Post-Watergate reforms sought to restore citizen confi-
dence in the political arena. Post-Enron reforms seek to restore inves-
tor confidence in the financial arena. New rules of professional 
conduct for attorneys were part of both reform movements. 
Reaction to the Enron scandal differed significantly from the re-
action to the Watergate scandal, however, in that the federal govern-
ment decided to directly regulate the legal profession and not to rely 
upon the traditional regulators of the legal profession, the legal pro-
fession itself and the state courts. Contrary to past practice, post-En-
123. Nagler & Wall, supra note 90. 
124. Hackett, supra note 90, at 20. 
125. Rachel McTague, Thirty Prominent Securities Lawyers Tell SEC Reporting Rules 
Threaten Public Companies, 18 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) No. 25, at 724-25 
(Dec. 4, 2002). 
126. 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2003). 
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ron, the federal government has decided to regulate the legal 
profession itself. The full consequences of this decision are difficult to 
predict at this early stage. It is unclear how far the federal govern-
ment will attempt to extend its reach in its regulation of the legal pro-
fession. It is also unclear how the legal profession will react to the 
possibility of a new regulatory regime. The different approaches 
taken by the federal government to the Watergate scandal and the 
Enron scandal cannot be explained by any differences in the two scan-
dals. Both involved the identical issue of an attorney's role when rep-
resenting an organizational client that has engaged in misconduct. 
The different responses in the aftermath of the Enron scandal, there-
fore, clearly demonstrate a new approach to the regulation of the legal 
profession. It may be that along with the investors and employees of 
Enron, self-regulation of the legal profession will be a victim of the 
Enron scandal. 
